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An Examination of the Ohio Law of Holidays
W. T. MALLiSON, Jn.*
The word "holiday" does not convey a precise meaning as
either a lay' or a legal 2 concept. A frank recognition that holi-
days exist for divers purposes may be of some value in approach-
ing a study of the subject. For example, Sundays are generally
regarded as holidays but, whether so regarded or not, it is widely
agreed that one of their main purposes is rest and there are fair-
ly precise statutory enunciations of the meaning and significance
to be accorded to Sundays.3 These take the form of a prohibited
list of activities and occupations. 4 Few courts have considered
the problem but a sound view is that a statutory declaration that
a particular day shall be a legal holiday, standing alone, is insuf-
ficient to assimilate the status of that day to Sunday.5 This article
is limited to an examination of holidays other than Sundays.
At least three broad mutually overlapping purposes of holi-
days may be readily perceived. First are holidays viewed from
the standpoint of commemoration of religious or historical events
or individuals. Second are holidays as planned periods of rest
and change from the routine occupations followed by the people
of Ohio. Sunday, a day of religious significance to many, is also
a day of variation from the regular daily pursuits. Third are
those holidays which are enumerated for the purpose of comput-
ing time allowed for the protest and payment of negotiable in-
struments. In addition to these three there are also special pur-
pose holidays.
* Teaching and Research Assistant, College of Law, The Ohio State Uni-
versity.
IWnsTa's NEW INTmNATIoNAL DicrnoNARY (2nd ed. 1948) defines "holi-
day" in part as follows:
1. HOLIDAY a. Now Rare.
2. Any day of exemption from labor or work; a festival day; hence, a
period of recreation or rest.
3. A day fixed by law for the suspension of business in whole or in
part; a legal holiday ....... "
2 BLAcx's LAW DicnoNARY (3rd ed. 1933) defines "legal holiday" as "A day
designated by law as exempt from judicial proceedings, service of process, de-
mand and protest of commercial paper, etc."
3 Omo GEx. CODE §§ 13044, 13049 (1948). Exceptions to the general pro-
visions are to be found in §§ 13045, 13046.
4Id.
5 Manning v. Young, 210 Wis. 588, 247 N. W. 61 (1933); Spalding & Bros.
v. Bernhard, 76 Wis. 368, 44 N.W. 643 (1890).
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LrcoLN's BIRmTHDAY .D CoLiumus DiscovERY DAY
The most comprehensive listing of holidays in the Ohio Stat-
utes is found under the general heading "Negotiable Instruments."
It should be noted that the final subdivision in the listing refers
generally to "the purpose of this division" but that such purpose
is nowhere expressly defined. The purpose must therefore be
taken to prescribe holidays for the purpose of the Negotiable
Instruments Law which is the subject of the division. The sec-
tion is entitled "Legal holidays" but there is no definition of the
expression. Of the holidays which may fall on any day of the
week, all except Lincoln's Birthday (the twelfth day of Febru-
ary) and Columbus Discovery Day (the twelfth day of October)
are observed on the following Monday when they fall on Sunday.7
Therefore, for the purposes of the Negotiable Instruments Law
these two holidays are roughly equivalent to Sunday when they
fall on Sunday.8 It is clear that Section 8301, General Code, to
the extent that it has any significance beyond the Negotiable
Instruments Law, treats Lincoln's Birthday and Columbus Dis-
covery Day as holidays of lesser importance. Similar treatment
is accorded these two holidays by Section 4838-1, General Code,
which provides that boards of education "may" dismiss the schools
under their control on certain enumerated days. The enumeration
6 O-to Gm. CODE § 8301 is quoted in full:
"Legal holidays.- The following days, viz.:
1. The first day of January, known as New Year's day;
2. The twenty-second day of February, known as Washington's birthday;
3. The thirtieth day of May, known as Decoration or Memorial day;
4. The fourth day of July, known as Independence day;
5. The first Monday of September, known as Labor day;
6. The twelfth day of October, known as Columbus Discovery day;
7. The eleventh day of November, known as Armistice day;
8. The twenty-fifth day of December, known as Christmas day;
9. Any day appointed and recommended by the governor of this state
or the president of the United States as a day of fast or thanksgiv-
ing;
10. The twelfth day of February, known as Lincoln's birthday; and
11. Any day which may hereafter be made a legal holiday, shall for the
purpose of this division, be holidays. But if the first day of January,
the twenty-second day of February, the thirtieth day of May, the
fourth day of July, the eleventh day of November or the twenty-
fifth day of December be the first day of the week, known as Sun-
day, the next succeeding secular or business day shall be a holiday."
7 See Puritan Chocolate Co. v. Samuel, 42 Ohio App. 376, 182 N.E. 322
(1932) to the effect that when New Year's Day fell on Sunday, the second day
of January was the legal holiday.
8 Of course, Lincoln's Birthday and Columbus Discovery Day are different
from other Sundays when they fall on Sunday in that they are also days of
historical commemoration.
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is the same as that in Section 8301, General Code, except that it
excludes Lincoln's Birthday, and Columbus Discovery Day and
includes "the days approved by the board of education for teach-
er's attendance at an educational meeting" in place of "any day
which may hereafter be made a legal holiday" found in the last
subsection of Section 8301, General Code. The significance of this
lesser degree of importance accorded to Lincoln's Birthday and
Columbus Discovery Day poses a troublesome problem for there
are in fact few guideposts to assist in the formulation of an evalu-
ation.
In answer to a question as to whether the departments of the
state were required to observe the following Monday as a holi-
day because February 12, 1928, fell on Sunday, the Attorney
General of Ohio held that Lincoln's Birthday was only a holiday
for the purposes of the Negotiable Instruments Law. "The fact
that the Legislature amended the first part of Section 8301 and
did not change paragraph 10 thereof so as to include Lincoln's
birthday is a clear indication that when the 12th day of Febru-
ary falls on Sunday the next succeeding secular or business day
is not to be a holiday."9 In King v. Paylor'° the question present-
ed involved the effective filing date of a paper left in the office
of a trial court clerk on Lincoln's Birthday with a notation to
the clerk stating that the paper was to be regarded as filed on
February 12. However, the clerk's office was not functioning on
the holiday and the clerk did not know of the existence of the
paper until the following day. In these circumstances it was held
that such action did not constitute a filing on February 12th.
The appellate court said that, "While Lincoln's birthday is made
a legal holiday by Section 8301, General Code, as that phrase is
used in the Negotiable Instruments Act,- it has not been made a
holiday for all purposes, or for the purpose of procedure or the
computation of time in which a procedural act should be done.""
It is submitted that this decision limits the significance of Lin-
coln's Birthday narrowly to the purposes of the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law.
Columbus Discovery Day has, very properly in the opinion of
the writer, been accorded treatment similar to Lincoln's Birth-
day. The holding by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Norman v.
State 1 2 is succinctly summarized in the fourth paragraph of the
syllabus as follows:
4. The 12th day of October, by virtue of Section 8301,
General Code, is made a legal holiday for the purposes of
9 1928 Ops. AT'r GEN. (Ohio) No. 1694, p. 343, 345.
10 69 Ohio App. 193, 43 N.E. 2d 313 (1942).
11 Id. at 195, 43 N.E. 2d at 314.
12109 Ohio St. 213, 142 N.E. 234 (1924), cert. denied, 264 U.S. 595 (1924).
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the "Negotiable Instruments Act," but a trial and verdict
of conviction in a criminal case are not rendered invalid
because taking place on that day.
It is not believed that the holding resulted either in a denial to
the defendant of any right to which he was entitled or miscon-
strued the law concerning the holiday. In the same way it has
been held by the Ohio Attorney General that Columbus Day is
not a holiday for all purposes but is only one for the purposes
of payment and protest of commercial paper.'3 The decision was
buttressed by pointing out that the legislature, if it had so de-
sired, could have made Columbus Day a holiday for all purposes
in the same way that it made Labor Day a holiday for all pur-
poses.' 4 The result reached is sound but the argument proves too
much as it fails to consider that a holiday may have significance
in more than one respect and still fall short of obtaining the status
of an all inclusive holiday.
Section 154-20, General Code, which is a part of the Adminis-
trative Code, prescribes certain hours of labor for state employees
and then excepts Saturday afternoons, Sundays, "and days de-
clared by law to be holidays."'15 It is small wonder that this
ambiguity 'resulted in a question to the attorney general as to
whether Lincoln's Birthday was a holiday. The answering opin-
ion stated that there was no definition of legal holiday which
would enable one to determine therefrom whether the fact that
a given day was a legal holiday authorized the cessation of public
work.' 6 The opinion then pointed out some of the more obvious
difficulties with the statutory law.'7 It concluded that state offi-
131917 Ops. ATr'Y GEN. (Ohio) No. 121, p. 289.
14OIo GEN. CODE § 5977 (1948). See note 28 infra.
15 OHIo GEN. CODE § 154-20 reads, in part, as follows:
"All employees in the several departments of the state service, except
the state highway department, shall render not less than eight hours
of labor each day, Saturday afternoons, Sundays and days declared
by law to be holidays excluded, except in cases in which, in the judg-
ment of the director, the public service will not [sic.] thereby be im-
paired ... "'
161929 Ops. Ar'Y GEN. (Ohio) No. 84, p. 118.
1i"Your inquiry is whether Lincoln's Birthday is a holiday, and the im-
plication is that your specific question is whether or not there is justification
for a cessation of public business and the closing of public offices on that day.
While, as I have before stated, Section 8301 of the Code does not itself even
attempt to call Lincoln's Birthday, or any of the days therein enumerated
legal holidays, but only holidays for the purpose of the negotiable instruments
act, yet, if the statute did specifically state that these days should be legal
holidays, we would be as much in the dark as to what significance to attach
to this provision of law as we are by reason of the statute as it exists at pres-
ent. This is so for the reason that there is no definition relating to legal
holidays whereby it may be determined whether or not the fact that a day is
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ces may, but are not required to, close on Lincoln's Birthday when
in the judgment of the department head the public service will
not be thereby impaired. It is clear that a result which either
prohibited or compelled the recognition of Lincoln's Birthday by
closing state offices would be without warrant in the statute.
An identical result would be obtained by analogy in the case of
Columbus Day. The two holidays receive the same statutory
treatment and there is no evidence which would tend to show
significant variations in their customary treatment. In the case
of each the customary treatment is based on recognition of its
importance as a day of historical remembrance and honor to the
one for whom the day is named.
The analysis of the law pertaining to Lincoln's Birthday and
Columbus Discovery Day reveals no instance in which either of
the days have been regarded as significant for purposes other
than those of the Negotiable Instruments Law. The statutory
deemphasis on these two holidays further strengthens the conclu-
sion that they are holidays for the purpose of the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law only. To this conclusion must be added the common
sense one that they are important days of historical commemo-
ration. These two purposes must be taken to exhaust the poten-
tialities of Lincoln's Birthday and Columbus Discovery Day un-
der the Ohio law.18
a legal holiday authorizes the cessation of public work. At the same time,
however, it is somewhat significant that the Legislature, in amending Section
8301 of the Code, supra, to include Lincoln's Birthday therein, did so by an
act entitled 'To amen4 Section 8301 of the General Code, making the twelfth
day of February, known as Lincoln's Birthday, a legal holiday.' Thus it will
be seen that the Legislature, while intending to make Lincoln's Birthday a
legal holiday, did not in fact so state in the body of the act itself. This fact is
in itself of some significance as indicating that the Legislature regarded all
of the days enumerated in Section 8301 of the Code as legal holidays, with all
of the attributes which legal holidays have. This is obviously true of such
days as New Year's Day, Christmas Day and Independence Day, which, as a
matter of long established custom, have been regarded as days upon which
public business should not be transacted. It was evidently the purpose of the
Legislature to place the other days in this section in exactly the same cate-
gory, for it would be ridiculous for me to hold that there was no authority
for the closing of public offices on Christmas Day, for instance, and yet there
is no more legal justification therefor than there is for the closing of offices
on Lincoln's Birthday. As a matter of fact, the legislation on the subject of
holidays generally is in need of clarification" Id. at p. 119.
1s Of the "legal holidays" in Ohio it is interesting to note that The Ohio
State University observes all except Lincoln's Birthday and Columbus Dis-
covery Day by the dismissal of classes. This should not be taken to mean
that these two holidays are not observed as, it is submitted, there may be
other modes of observation than the dismissal of classes. The University's
custom in requiring the attendance of students and the performance of usual
services by faculty and staff on these two holidays is, in itself, a strong argu-
ment as to its legality.
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LABOR DAY, NEW YEAR'S DAY, INDEPEmENcE DAY, THANKSGIVING
DAY AND CHaIsT'VrAs DAY
We have found that Lincoln's Birthday and Columbus Dis-
covery Day receive little statutory recognition. At the opposite
pole is Labor Day which receives seemingly unequivocal recog-
nition. The portion of Section 5977, General Code, which con-
cerns Labor Day reads as follows:
The first Monday in September of each year shall be
known as "Labor Day" and for all purposes shall be con-
sidered as the first day of the week.
It is noteworthy that Labor Day is the only holiday which is
expressly stated to be "for all purposes."
One would suppose that the phrase "for all purposes" is all
inclusive. However, when the question of the validity of a pro-
ceeding to advertise and sell a state aid road on Labor Day was
presented to the Attorney General of Ohio, he answered that the
act was valid though one to be deprecated as a violation of that
which was intended to be established by Section 5977, General
Code.1 9 It is difficult to understand why the legislature should
not have succeeded in its attempt to make Labor Day a holiday
"for all purposes." It would seem that an ordinary business act
such as effectuating a sale is most clearly the type of activity
sought to be prevented by the Labor Day legislation.
In State v. Thomas,20 the court was confronted with the prob-
lem as to whether an indictment returned by a grand jury im-
paneled and sworn on Labor Day was valid. In view of the
statute previously enacted which concerned times of holding terms
and which placed no limitation on the impaneling and swearing
of grand juries on Labor Day,21 the court found no difficulty in
holding that the indictment was valid. It is submitted that this
result is correct notwithstanding the broad language of the Labor
Day statute. The Labor Day statute is simply inapplicable be-
cause of the existence of the statute which expressly covers the
fact situation involved.
In Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Krauss,22 the court's holding was
summarized in paragraph two of the syllabus as follows:
2. Where last day for filing bill of exceptions under
Section 11564, General Code, fell on Labor Day, it was
permissible to file exceptions on the day following, under
Section 5977, which provided that Labor Day, for all
purposes, shall be considered as the first day of the week,
191911-1912 Ors. Avr'Y GEN. (Ohio) No. A 334, p. 840.
20 61 Ohio St. 444, 56 N.E. 276 (1900).
21 Omo GEN. CODE § 1533 (1948). The previous statute was Omo REv. STAT.
§457.
22 28 Ohio App. 205, 161 N.E. 563 (1927).
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and Section 10216, which requires exclusion of Sundays
in computing time for doing acts required by law; the
first day of the week being interpreted as Sunday under
Section 13044.
This result is clearly correct. It could not have been based upon
Section 8298, General Code.23
In Spiedel Grocery Co. v Armstrong24 it was held that a judg-
ment rendered on Labor Day was void. In the absence of a par-
ticularly applicable statute it seems proper to hold the general
provisions of the Labor Day statute applicable.
What is the net result of the law applicable to Labor Day?
The statutory language is the strongest applied to any "legal holi-
day" in Ohio. It is believed that a sound interpretation of the
statute requires an effectuation of the holiday "for all purposes"
except where an unequivocal and specific statute requires differ-
ent treatment.
New Year's Day, Independence Day, Thanksgiving Day, and
Christmas Day are generally conceded to be important holidays
both within and without Ohio. They are all listed in Section 8301,
General Code, as legal holidays for purposes of the Negotiable
Instruments Law and each is observed on the following business day
when it falls on Sunday. In the same way, all are listed in Sec-
tion 4838-1, General Code, as days upon which school boards may
dismiss the schools under their control. The statutory statement
of these holidays standing alone does not require the treatment
which the holidays receive. What, then, is the basis upon which
the recognition of these days as important holidays is founded?
It would appear that custom stabilized over a long period of time
establishes the place of these four holidays.25 In 1918 the Attorney
General of Ohio aptly stated the situation by saying that ". . . it
would be ridiculous for me to hold that there was no authority
for the closing of public offices on Christmas Day, for instance,
and yet there is no more legal justification therefor than there
is for the closing of offices on Lincoln's Birthday."20 It is believed
that the only reason that such a holding would be ridiculous is
that the customary recognition accorded to Christmas Day as a
religious holiday and as a day of change from the usual pursuits
of the people would prevent state employees and others from
rendering their usual services or performing their usual occupa-
23 Omo GEN. CODE § 8298 (1948) is applicable only to the computation of
time for the purpose of the Negotiable Instruments Law.
24 4 Ohio C.D. 498, 8 Ohio C.C. 489 (1894), aff'd, 53 Ohio St. 657, 44 NE.
1130 (1895).25 See note 17, supra, for an indication of the customary recognition ac-
corded to New Year's Day, Independence Day, and Christmas Day. Thanks-
giving Day is not included in the group.
20 See note 17, supra.
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tions on Christmas Day. This is not to say that the individual,
if he chose, could not work on Christmas Day or that exceptions
must not be recognized in order to maintain a flow or a reser-
voir of essential public and private services. It does say that it
would run so contrary to the general acceptance of Christmas Day
as a holiday that it would be without warrant in law to general-
ly require the rendition of usual work and labor on Christmas
Day. It is believed that the argument applies equally to New
Year's Day, Independence Day, and Thanksgiving Day. New Year's
Day and Independence Day are different from Christmas Day in
the kind of popular recognition they receive but are also among
the most significant holidays. It is believed that to require the
rendition of usual work on either of these two days would be
without warrant in law. Certainly, the legislature must be pre-
sumed to have been aware of the customary importance of all
four of those holidays.
One of the primary purposes of Thanksgiving Day, as pro-
claimed by the President or by the Governor of Ohio, is to pro-
vide a day of rest from one's usual labors in which to celebrate
Thanksgiving Day in the traditional American way. The elimi-
nation of the day of rest and change from one's usual occupation
would effectively destroy the possibility of traditional celebration
of the day. Therefore, Thanksgiving Day, along with New Year's
Day, Independence Day and Christmas Day, should because of long
customary recognition be placed in the same status which Labor
Day has achieved by statutory enactment.
WASH=NGTON'S BmTiIDAY, MEmORrAL DAY, AND ARMISTICE DAY
These three holidays receive statutory recognition similar to
Lincoln's Birthday and Columbus Day in that they are days on
which school boards may dismiss schools27 and stronger recogni-
tion in that each of the three is to be observed on the next busi-
ness day when it falls on Sunday.28 Armistice Day has received
additional statutory sanction of a character which strengthens it
generally but which leaves much to be desired as far as precise defi-
nition is concerned. 29 Enunciation of the status of Armistice Day
as "a legal holiday"3 0 is the beginning of the problem of the
2 7 QHo GEN. CODE § 4838-1 (1948).
28OHIo GEN. CODE § 8301 (1948).
29 OIo GFx. CODE § 5977 (1948) makes Labor Day a holiday "for all pur-
poses" and then prescribes Armistice Day in the following language: "The
eleventh day of November shall be known as Armistice day and is hereby
declared to be a legal holiday, and if said day falls on Sunday the following
Monday shall be the legal Armistice holiday."
30id.
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significance to be accorded to the day rather than its end.31 An
opinion by the attorney general that Armistice Day is a legal holi-
day and that boards of education have the legal power to dismiss
schools on that day does not provide the needed clarity.32 The
power of a board of education to dismiss school is found in the
statute allowing boards to dismiss school on certain enumerated
days33 and it is not believed that the Armistice Day statute34
adds anything to that power. It could be argued that the exist-
ence of a separate Armistice Day statute tends to lend strength
and importance to the status of the day as a holiday. However,
the context of the Armistice Day provisions, which immediately
follow provisions making Labor Day a holiday "for all purposes,"3
clearly diminishes the status of Armistice Day in comparison with
that of Labor Day. It should require no argument to show that
Armistice Day is not a holiday "for all purposes."
What then is the meaning of Armistice Day as a "legal holi-
day"? There is certainly substantial support for the day because
of its significance as a day of commemoration of the ending of
the first World War. In a sense the day is one of rejoicing at
the cessation of a terrible human conflict but in a larger sense
it is a day of reverence and commemoration. The celebration of
Armistice Day does not require those modes of rejoicing asso-
3 1 An example of the ambiguous status of Armistice Day is shown by the
following quotation from 1929 Ops. ATrY. Gmr. (Ohio) No. 1171, p. 1752 at
1753:
"Quite evidently it was the intention of the Legislature to make Armistice
day, and the succeeding Monday in cases where Armistice day falls on Sun-
day, a legal holiday. Just what significance attaches to this, however, is not
at all clear.
"It will be noted that Section 8301 of the Code is found in the group of
laws relating to negotiable instruments, and it has been held by this office on
several occasions that its force only extends so far as is necessary in the ap-
plication of the law of negotiable instruments. Attention should further be
directed to the fact that subdivision 11 provides 'any day which may hereafter
be made a legal holiday, shall for the purpose of this division, be holidays.'
Apparently, therefore, the section only purports to make the various days
therein enumerated holidays for the limited purpose of negotiable instru-
ments.
"The provisions of Section 5977, supra, make it clear, however, that Armis-
tice day is to be treated as a legal holiday generally. There is, however, no
statute defining just what significance must be attached to the declaration of
the Legislature in this respect Nowhere is the statement to be found that
public work shall cease, although by custom the authority of proper officials
to provide for cessation of work on those days is well established."
321929 Ors. ATr. GEN. (Ohio) No. 1171, p. 1752.
3 3 Oro GEr. CODE § 4838-1 (1948).
34 Omo GEN. CODE § 5977 (1948).
35 See note 28, supra.
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ciated with holidays such as New Year's Day, Independence Day
and Christmas Day. It would be equally fallacious to state cate-
gorically that the law did or did not require the observance of
Armistice Day as a day of rest from usual work and labor. Un-
til the statute law is clarified we must recognize the ambiguous
status of the day and allow its observance or non-observance as
a day of rest to be left to private action.36
As has been indicated, Washington's Birthday and Memorial
Day receive the same statutory treatment as does Armistice Day
except that they do not receive separate additional statutory sanc-
tion. However, the separate Armistice Day statute is so equivo-
cal that it is submitted there is no substantial difference between
these two days and Armistice Day. Certainly Washington's Birth-
day and Memorial Day are also accorded substantial historical
and commemorative significance. The customary recognition of
the three days now under consideration is primarily along the
lines of historical understanding and appreciation rather than the
modes of outward and visible celebration recognized as appropri-
ate for some of the other holidays. The citizen who would be
highly offended at the thought of performing his usual labor or
services on Christmas Day is at least less disturbed by the
possibility of performing services on any of these three days.
Private action is also a suitable mode for determining whether
Washington's Birthday and Memorial Day should be observed as
holidays. The legislature has instructed neither the citizenry nor
the various branches and agencies of the state as to the effect to
be given to Washington's Birthday, Memorial Day, and Armistice
Day. The silence of the legislature with regard to these three
days makes the matter purely one of discretion.
SPECIAL PURPOSE HOIDAYS
Each year election day is made a holiday.37 The statutory decla-
ration standing alone is not a model of clarity3 8 but the obvious
purpose of making the day a holiday gives content to the statute.
This is indicated by the following quotation from an opinion of the
attorney general:
Even without the legislative history..., the purpose of
30 There is no reason for a uniform result to be expected or desired. For
example, many who would think that the transaction of business for profit
as usual on Armistice Day was inappropriate would regard it as singularly
fitting observation of the day for institutions of higher learning to remain
open.
37Omo Gra. CODE § 5976 (1948).38 Om GEN. CODE § 5976 reads as follows: "The first Tuesday after the
first Monday in November of each year, between the hours of twelve o'clock
noon, central standard time, and five thirty o'clock p.m. central standard time,
shall be a legal part holiday."
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Section 5976 is manifest. The object of the legislature was
to make it possible for the citizens of the state to be re-
lieved from their ordinary duties, for a sufficient period
of time to enable them to perform their more important
duty of participating in the conduct of the affairs of their
government. The section was and is a statute pertaining
to elections.3 9
As long as the purpose of the statute is considered there should
be no difficulty in construing it.
"V-J Day"40 is an example of a special purpose holiday which
does not recur periodically. The spontaneity of the occasion guided
by the purpose as stated in the proclamation is usually sufficient
to afford adequate information as to the purpose and effect of the
special holiday. Of course, the problem would be complicated if
the non-recurring special purpose holiday fell on other than a
Sunday.
CONCLUSION
It is perfectly clear that a precise evaluation of the so-called
"legal holidays" in Ohio must await the substitution of legislative
precision in place of the present ambiguity. It is believed that the
following summary is as definite an evaluation of the law of holi-
days in Ohio as the present legislation permits:
1. For purposes of the NIL:
a. Lincoln's Birthday.
b. Columbus Discovery Day.
2. For purposes as determined by private action (or public
action in the case of public employees):
a. Washington's Birthday.
b. Memorial Day.
c. Armistice Day.
3. "For all purposes:"
a. Labor Day (express statutory sanction).
b. New Year's Day.
c. Independence Day.
d. Thanksgiving Day.
e. Christmas Day.
The legislature could easily clarify the law of holidays by mak-
ing a separate listing in one section of all the holidays "for all pur-
poses." Some such definition as the following suggested one would
result in substantial clarification:
Holidays for all purposes are days on which the per-
formance of usual public or private work, labor, service,
or other employment or occupation shall not be required.
Nothing in this section shall operate to prohibit the per-
formance of such work which of necessity must be per-
39 1927 Ors. ATr'y. GEN. (Ohio) No. 1158, p. 2042 at 2044.
40 3 CODE FED. BEGs. PROCLAMATION No. 2660 (1945 Supp.). "V-J Day" was
Sunday, August 19, 1945.
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formed on such holiday. It is the intention of this section
to establish each of the holidays hereinafter enumerated
as an extra day of rest. When any holiday for all purposes
falls on Sunday (the first day of the week) the next suc-
ceeding day, which would otherwise not be a holiday, shall
be the holiday for all purposes.
The legislature would in all probability wish to enumerate all
the holidays "for all purposes" as summarized. It might be desir-
able to include some or all of those which are now subject to de-
termination by private action.
